ill Legalist: January 2010

Thursday, January 28, 2010

contracts: jan 28 class notes

recap: mistake.

we want to encourage people to get information and to exploit it so that there's not mistake.

however, price is more effective as a determinative than expertise.

price as evidence of mistake:

boise case - mistake, the bid had mistake where price might be evidence of mistake. a party is entitled to recission due to a unilateral mistake.

lenawee county case - parties inserted an "as is" clause

ayer v. western union - where price is evidence of a mistake paradigm: the price was stated correctly but the telegraph incorrectly transmitted the information (cross reference to hadley)

onebeacon

sherwood

if price is not a factor, then the court will look at the relative information positions of the parties.

parole evidence rule additional information that could shed light on the agreement between the parties is extrinsic to the written contract.

the question is whether or not the additional material is admissible.

mitchill v. lath

can the lath's promise to remove the lunn's ice house be enforced against the written contract formed with the mitchill?

masterson v. sine

pacific gas v. drayage traynor's opinion is not how this material is usually handled

confold v. polaris (interesting secondary read, "who owns your future business?")

confold brings forth the issue with extrinsic evidence raising ambiguity to meaning

frigiliament v. bns (fresh chicken case)

in re katrina (interesting blog article about the 5th circuit and katrina insurance)

see notes p. 688 - the hierarchy of interpretation rules eyal zamir, the inverted hierarchy of contract interpretation and supplementation, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1710, 1718-19(1997)

masterson v. sine

Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal.2d 222, 436 P.2d 561, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968).

Facts: Dallas and Rebecca Masterson (P) owned a ranch as tenants in common which they conveyed by grant deed to Dallas’ sister and her husband (i.e. Sine, D). Masterson reserved an option to repurchase the ranch within ten years in exchange for the consideration paid by Sine, plus the depreciation value of any improvements. Dallas later went bankrupt. Rebecca and Dallas’ trustee in bankruptcy (P1) brought a declaratory judgment action to establish their right to exercise the option.

No jury. At a bench trial the court determined that the parol evidence rule precluded admission of extrinsic evidence offered by Ds to show that the parties wanted the property kept in the Masterson family, and that the option was therefore personal to the grantors and could not be exercised by the trustee in bankruptcy. The court entered judgment in favor of P and D appealed on the grounds that the option provision was too uncertain to be enforced and extrinsic evidence as to meaning should not have been admitted.

Parole evidence can be used to information integrated to the portions of the agreement not reduced to writing. Did the parties intend the written agreement to be the exclusive body of the agreement?

Issues: 1) Under what circumstances should evidence of oral collateral agreements be excluded? 2) How must the court determine whether a collateral agreement is such that it might naturally have been made as a separate agreement?

Holding and Rule (Traynor): 1) Evidence of oral collateral agreements should be excluded only when the fact finder is likely to be misled. 2) When determining that a collateral agreement is such that it might naturally be made as a separate agreement, the court must look to the actual experience and dealings between the parties as they view the status of such a collateral agreement.

The court held that it was error for the trial court to exclude extrinsic evidence that the option was personal to the grantors and therefore non-assignable. If an agreement is complete, parole evidence cannot be used to vary, contradict, or add to the terms of the contract. If an agreement is partial, parol evidence can be shown to prove the elements of the contract not reduced to writing.

Corbin on Contracts. It must be determined whether the parties intended the written agreement to be the final and complete embodiment of the terms; i.e., whether the agreement was an integration.

The court held that if the contract states that there are no previous understandings or agreements not contained in the writing and thus clearly it expresses the parties’ intentions to nullify antecedent understandings or agreements, it need look no further for merger clauses. Otherwise, any collateral agreement must be examined to determine if the parties intended them to be included in, excluded from, or otherwise be affected by the writing. Circumstances at the time of the writing may be used to determine whether there has been an integration.

Restatement 1st Section 240 (1)(b) permits proof of a collateral agreement if such an agreement would be naturally made by parties similarly situated as were the parties to the written agreement. UCC 2-202 states that parole evidence is not admissible if the additional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they would certainly have been included in the written contract. Thus they would exclude the evidence in still fewer instances. The option contract did not explicitly provide that it contained the complete agreement.

The deed does not address assignability. This was a deed and from the very nature of deeds, the formalized structure does not lend itself to the insertion of collateral agreements and makes it less likely that all the terms of such an agreement were included.

Even when there is no explicit agreement that contractual duties shall be personal, courts will presume that intent if the circumstances indicate that performance by substituted persons would be different from that contracted for (Restatement 150). The court held that under these facts, it appeared that the collateral agreement would have been made as a separate agreement; parol evidence of the issue of assignability must be allowed.

Disposition: Reversed.

Dissent (Burke): The right of an optionee to transfer his option to purchase property is one of the basic rights accompanying the option, unless limited by the language of the option itself. To allow an optionor to resort to parol evidence to support his assertion that the written option is not transferable is to authorize him to limit the option by attempting to restrict and reclaim rights with which he has already parted. There was nothing ambiguous about the granting language of the option and not the slightest suggestion in the document that the option was to be non-assignable. To permit such words of limitation to be added by parol is to contradict the absolute nature of the grant and to directly violate the parol evidence rule.

confold v. polaris

Around 1993, Polaris retained ConFold to conduct a "reverse logistics analysis" to determine whether Polaris should switch from disposable to reusable/returnable containers for shipping its vehicles. 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 513, at *1-2. Prior to performing any work, ConFold and Polaris entered into a mutual NDA, titled "Mutual Non-Disclosure Agreement – Logistics Consulting Version" (the "Agreement"). Id. at *2-3.

The preamble of the Agreement stated ConFold and Polaris desired to exchange "information for purposes of both companies developing future business with each other." Id. at *7 (emphasis added). Under the Agreement, the parties were not to disclose outside of their respective companies "any information" provided in writing and appropriately designated, and to refrain from using such information except in connection with future transactions between the parties. Agreement at 1. Soon after the Agreement was signed, and before the logistical analysis was completed, Polaris requested ConFold and eight other companies to provide an actual product design proposal. See 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS at *2.

Believing this to be part of the original project, ConFold submitted design plans and drawings to Polaris, but Polaris accepted neither ConFold's proposal or any of the eight others. Id. Two years later, Polaris began selling a reusable shipping container that ConFold claimed was based on the design that ConFold had submitted in response to the request for proposals. Id. ConFold filed suit in Wisconsin federal district to enforce the NDA, and asserted claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, but lost on summary judgment.

property: jan 28 2010 class notes

recap.

bailments.

winkfield.

relationship between three parties: true owner -- middle person -- third party

who do we want to hold responsible for double liability?

economic argument

adverse possession (possession that ripens into ownership)

in reality of modern times, these are cases where people accidentally go over the allotment of their property lines.

van valkenburg v. lutz

johnson v. macintosh (review for the way that we determine

why allow this? resources can be put to productive use that will make us all better off; doctrine of latches;

what does our jurisprudence do to ameliorate the potential unfairness to this (beyond our principles of latches)? the four factor test we imply, the elements of reliance

holmes: "when you possess a thing long enough, you start to feel like it's yours even if it isn't"

endowment effect (upenn reading on endowment effect)

what does it mean to physically possess land? color of title issues

why a title? title gives some limits to the adverse possessor's claim.

color of title can limit what might otherwise be vague claims.

beyond this, we only have evidence from the adverse possessor's actual behavior.

problem

O owns and has been in possession of a 100-acre farm since 1975. in 1990, A entered the back 40 acres under color of an invalid deed from Z (who had no claim to the land) for the entire 100 acres. since her entry, A has occupied and improved the back 40 acres in the usual manner for the period required by the statute of limitations. A brings suit to evict O from the farm, claiming title by constructive adverse possession. what result?

- A does not have exclusive possession because actual trumps constructive possession

problem

two contiguous lots, 1 and 2 are owned by X and Y, who are not in possession. the lots are conveyed by an invalid deed from Z to A who enters lot 1 and occupies it in the usual manner for the period required by the SOL. subsequently, A sues X and Y to quiet title to lots 1 and 2. what result?

- this is a problem of ejectment. A wins against X but not against Y because A has not exercised possession over the plot owned by Y and there was nothing

mannillo v. gorski

element 1: hostile

what's hostile in adverse possession?

three assertions to ownership: (1) i thought it was mine (2) i meant to take it by force (3)i didn't mean to but encroached

maine doctrine (assertion 2, you must intend to take) see Preble v. Maine

criticism - this awards trespassers as opposed to people with good faith, and we don't want to encourage that

connecticut doctrine (any of the three assertions work) see French v. Pierce

adoption - conn is more objective, and will not change stare decisis the court's treatment of reliance

element 2: open & notorious

what's open and notorious? "clear and unequivocal and to such an extent as to be immediately visible, the owner may be presumed to have knowledge of the adverse occupancy..."

here, subjective state of mind is relevant: did the property owner know that the defendant was encroaching? the only way to know is review of the facts, so court remands.

result: court essentially forces the parties back to the bargaining table.

walling v. przybylo

this case comes on the heels of a vetoed NYS bill proposal to outlaw adverse possession

the court generally says that "conduct will prevail over knowledge" (connecticut doctrine)

Defendants argue that there is no claim of right when the adverse possessor has actual knowledge of the true owner at the time of possession. However, longstanding decisional law does not support this position. The adverse possessor must act under claim of right...By definition, a claim of right is adverse to the title owner and also in opposition to the rights of the true owner. Conduct will prevail over knowledge, particularly when the true owners have acquiesced in the exercise of ownership rights by the adverse possessors...The fact that adverse possession will defeat a deed even if the adverse possessor has knowledge of the deed is not new...The issue is "actual occupation," not subjective knowledge....

this case overrules lutz *and* created resulting NY Laws Ch. 269 (and n.b. prof parella helped to draft this statute)

so now, shrubs and fences do not "take possession", and neither does mowing the land...

in NYS, an adverse possessor in order to establish he had the claim of right element of the statute must show that he had a good faith belief that hte land he was possessing is legally his.

Prof Parella helped draft

interesting insights directly from the wallings and przybylo also on the issues of adverse possession

Wednesday, January 27, 2010

legal writing: jan 27 2010

memo is due feb 7th at 12pm.

form and content (go general to specific):

heading

paragraph about the WARN Act, the good faith provision, and give the good faith quote.

then what?

intro. a paragraph that collects general information about the section that the court should know, including purpose of the good faith provision; explain how the exception is construed (narrow/broad); preponderance; two elements of the test (subj AND obj)

how does subj get satisfied? how does obj get satisfied?

then move to the specific information, including separation of the subjective and objective elements ("in legal writing, structure the writing around the structure of the rule itself");

subj: did they have a good faith intent to comply? obj: is it reasonable to think that the defendant thought it had complied with the act? if both elements are not met, the courts have not granted relief in the damages.

discretion. if both elements are met, then it is in the court's discretion to reduce damages. but by how much? is there a scale by which courts determine the reduction? is there any guidance in the case history or a scale for damage reduction?

standard of review. (3 part test: subjective, objective, discretion: saxion is part of the standard of review) the most useful and important part of the memo (i.e. what will separate good and average anaylsis) if the subj and obj are met, and the judge decides in discretion to/ not to reduce damages, what is the standard of review for the cases? is there a standard for each prong of the test?

closing. "in most published cases where the courts have considered this issue, the employer has/ has not been successful in showing good faith and the judge has/has not reduced damages." recap the highlights of the explanation, the main points to walk away with. is reduction more likely or less likely granted? what is the standard most frequently used?

29 usc 2104(a)(4) article research...

law review articles

3 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 113 - Judicial Interpretation of the WARN Act Exceptions and Their Implications in the Health Care Industry (keep eyes open for legis history, and see if there's anything there that is helpful)

key cite and shepardize.

two reasons: 1) is this good law? (what happened in the case? how have other cases treated this case?) 2) references to other cases

in westlaw - go to 'keycite' and enter the citation you want to check.

in lexis - go to 'shepard's'... shepardizing gives a much more complete history

c.f.r. is to regulations as u.s.c. is to statutes

20 c.f.r. 639 is useful, but does not address the exception we are concerned with.

citations of subsequent history (ICW ex 10)

con law: jan 27 2010

declaratory judgments.

when we want the court to give some decree, actions that authorize court to dispositively resolve controversies before it goes further

challenged by nashville v. wallace

more justiciability.

ripeness.

prudential doctrine. the issue hasn't become timely because the events are being anticipated, and may not occur.

mootness.

another prudential/ fact based doctrine. there's nothing more to litigate because the issue is no longer a legal issue.

exceptions to mootness can be shaped by the plaintiff's pleading.

go here for interesting essay on mootness by matthew hall.

back to 10th amendment: why states?

n.b. -- consider the tenth amendment movement and the oklahoma senate plan to not follow no child left behind act...

necessary and proper: a gloss that gives other federal ends clout
if the court is pursuing anything in the constitution, then it just needs to be rational and
for the exam: talk first about the rule and threshold question of what rule is being used, and then the most updated application from sabri v. US: "

mccullough v. maryland marshall did not see the constitution as a contract between sovereign states

aggressive federalism: mccullough v. maryland

the threshold question: by what power can the nat'l gov't create a bank? what power is being used?

"necessary and proper" art I, s. 8, c. 18 powers, but the power to create a bank is not freestanding.

congress doesn't have total authority, but instead can do what is necessary to regulate interstate commerce.... is this just a redundancy? the us amends the clause to read just "necessary and proper" instead of absolutely

where the constitution is silent on the state's power to act, the state is presumed to have the power to act.

mccullough part II.
can states tax the gov't?
the federal gov't has sovergniety.

why constitution vs a legal code type mechanism? b/c a constitution encourages longevity...

us term limits v. thornton

thorton was a senator and AK had a law of congressional term limits that were different from US congressional term limits.
thorton and AK get the authority to bring this suit under the 10th amd't.

stevens: (maj.) "the 10th amd't can't preserve what didn't exist before." the states have their original powers and originally ratified powers (before they give the nat'l gov't the federal powers under the constitution), but cannot ratify to add new powers now.

kennedy: (conc.) "uniformity and nat'l character that the framers meant to ensure" by "splitting the atom of sovereignty" between the state and federal for the citizens

thomas and scalia: (diss) the dissent says that there is nothing in the constitution that deprives the people of AK of the power to enact such measures.

congress regulates interstate commerce too, via the commerce clause, and the dormant commerce clause.

dormant commerce clause help.

crim law: jan 27 class notes

"good samaritan law?? you don't have to help anyone in this country!"

the ease/difficulty of drawing the line of duty...

legal duties:

1. statutory

2. status (parent/child and spouse/spouse)

3. contractual

4. voluntary assumption of care and seclusion (i.e., the good samaritan created a duty when he acted, couldn't just leave the guy once he'd started rescuing him)

5. creation of the peril

why do we want to impose duties on beardsley and blanche?

U: encourage rescue R: punish immoral behavior

"free society" argument, that people should be free to act voluntarily

wherewithal for the duty:

1. knowledge of the peril

2. ability to help

3. knowledge of the facts giving rise to the duty

duty + wherewithal = ACT

act + mental state + causation =

beardsley cont.

when is there a duty? what mental state and prerequisite knowledge is required for the defendant to be on the line?

how can we establish some kind of relationship here? you owe a duty to not be negligent to anyone on your property or in your residence when you invite them...

so why let beardsley off the hook?

1. no statutory duty

2. no formal status -- ct takes a moralistic view of imposing duty on sex partners would elevate the status of the relationship in a socially degrading way

3. contractual -- is there not an implicit contract that she's been invited to his home to be under his care in some way?

4. seclusion --

5. creation of the peril --

"weak argument": logical fallacy (slippery slope)

why not make everyone have a duty to everyone else?

the kitty geneovese.

why not have good samaritan statutes?

david cash.

why not legislate morality? isn't the retributive theory underlying the criminal doctrine?

moral questions about which people do and do not agree.

Tuesday, January 26, 2010

con law: jan 26 2010

ripeness.

mootness.

political questions.
cases where the congress should review the issue, not the court

justicability doctrines (keeping adjudication low) vs. merit questions (adjudicating questions) - justiciability is court created for court discretion.

political question doctrine has developed to make it less of an obstacle

baker v. carr - the case that made justice whittaker resign

the facts: tenn has not had a reapportionment of voting districts in 60 years. baker is a rep in memphis (shelby county), and his district has almost 10x the population than the rural districts, which still had more voting power. carr is the sec of st in tenn, and baker sues him ex officio. baker argues that the disproportionment has caused him to fail to receive the equal protection guaranteed under the 14th amd't. tenn argued that this was a political question for the legislature to decide.

the issue: is the challenge to the reapportionment of the tn legislature a political question barred by the justiciability limits on the court, or is it an equal protection question, which is well within the justiciability rights of the court?

the reasoning: Just b/c a suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean that it presents a political question. Nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers and must be argued on a case by case basis.

Foreign relations: precedent says all foreign relations questions are political questions, but this is not true. It has been said that if there has been no conclusive governmental action then a court can construe a treaty and may find it provides the answer.

Dates of duration of hostilities: when there needs to be definable clarification for a decision, the political question barrier falls away.

Validity of enactments: with political questions, come the need to clarify policy, determine initial policy, to settle what is judicially discoverable and manageable standards to answering it. Unless one of these issues is undeniably tied into the case-at-bar, then there should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground of a political question's presence.

It's argued that this is a case which has not yet been considered: those which involve the Guaranty Clause and the guaranty of a republican form of gov't, which involves a political question.

Justice Brennan established the contours of the PQD in Baker v. Carr: (6 potential factors)

Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found:

(1) a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;

(2) or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;

(3) or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion;

(4) or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of government;

(5) or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;

(6) or the potentiality of embarrassment to the gov't from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.

the holding: The “political question” doctrine is based in the separation of powers and whether a case is justiciable is determined on a case by cases basis. In regards to foreign relations, if there has been no conclusive governmental action regarding an issue then a court can construe a treaty and decide a case. Regarding the dates of the duration of hostilities, when there needs to be definable clarification for a decision, the court may be able to decide the case.

The court held that this case was justiciable and did not present a political question. The case did not present an issue to be decided by another branch of the government. The court noted that judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause were well developed and familiar, and it had been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine if an act is arbitrary and capricious and reflects no policy. When a question is enmeshed with any of the other two branches of the government, it presents a political question and the Court will not answer it without further clarification from the other branches.

Guaranty Clause argument: the majority says that this is not guaranty clause. the dissent says that it is. they lose. who's right and how should we argue? we should make a strong argument for both sides -- the case is decided 5/4 with awfully long and brutal thunkulating on the US' part. so practice making the arguments of both sides of the opinion.

takeaway: baker v. carr is not meant to tie 14th amd't to guaranty clause, nor to say that one will/will not always trump the other.

however, baker does overrule colegrove v. green (where the court refused to hear or decide a case challenging the constitutional validity of IL's congressional districts which were not equally proportioned).

SIGNPOST! if you see a PQ, apply art I s. V: got to look at it to see if congress has the power to govern the issue presented.

nixon v. us

what's nixon's constitutional complaint? the language says that the senate will review and hear the matter. senate is a bright line thing -- 100 guys with seats looking at his case -- and nixon claims he didn't get this right to a fair trial (BOR 6)

what does the model of deliberation matter? (maj.)you got a senate moment because art. I s 3, cl. 6 says "senate shall have *sole* power to try all Impeachments" and this is not a run of the mill trial, it's an impeachment. "try" should mean that the senate can choose its subcommittee. if the issue had never reached the senate, then it wouldn't have had review, but it has been reviewed. (conc.) seperation of power is different from supremacy of an actor. there's a merit's question to the political question here: the senate has the textual authoritative power over Impeachment. this power can be abused unless there's a check point, and that check should be the judicial branch.

bush v. gore

did the court need to put it's nose back into this issue?

would it have been impossible to live with a messier alternative i.e., hayes election?

breyer argues that this is a prudential question, not a political one.

clinton, in the aftermath, has called this case the modern dred scott.

"subtle wounds" for legal community: we don't need to know who would have won from florida, but the partisan affiliation of the 9 on the supreme court that they are 9 politicians with life appointments...

however, sandra day o'connor says, "It was a hard decision to make. But I do know this: there were at least three separate recounts of the votes, the ballots, in the four counties where it was challenged and not in one of the recounts would the election have changed. So I don't worry."

"political question is a doctrine to remind justices that sometimes, they have to lean away from their political bend"

why value the states? what's the rationale, beyond 10th amd't?

11th amd't (won't be tested on it)

chisholm v. GA (you have the right as a non-citizen to sue a state)

however, state sovereignty has regrown and 11th amd't has been inserted:

hans v. LA (can't sue the state) and ex parte young (but can sue employees of state gov'ts)

seminole tribe (congress can't abrogate 11th amd't/state sovereign immunity under art.I)

alden v. ME (ME can't be hauld into its own court as a party)

hibbs

theory: federalism doctrine question went on hiatus after renquist's death. however, the war and the national security put this as a secondary issue.

van valkenburg v. lutz

Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz

Facts: AP's bought land which was previously APE's for 15 years in a foreclosure sale. After APE cleared most of his belongings off the land which was foreclosed upon, but argued he still had the right to the traveled way to his remaining property, which were on property adjacent and behind the foreclosed land. AP built a fence blocking the right of way, which had been used for several years by APE's.

Rule: NY Law: "To acquire title to real property by adverse possession not founded upon a written instrument, it must be shown by clear and convincing proof that for at least 15 years there was an "actual" occupation under a claim of title, for it is only the premises so actually occupied "and no others" that are deemed to have been held adversely.

Issue: Under adverse possession, does a person have a right of traveled way through someone’s property?

Reasoning: The court ruled that there was a two ways that someone could obtain land through adverse possession: 1) by enclosing the land or 2) by cultivating or improving the land. The court ruled that the (D) did neither in this case. They did not cultivate all the land and they did not improve the land.

Dissenting: they did improve they land; they tilled it, plowed it, cultivated it, built on it, etc. They did use the majority of the property as they should have.

Notes:

There must be (1) an actual entry giving exclusive possession that is (2) open an notorious, (3) adverse and under claim of rights, and (4) continuous for the statutory period.

Ewing v. Burnet – there is a difference between being absent and abandoning property.

Entry and exclusive passion rule: title can come from adverse possession if the property is used for eth duration of the time needed in a manner that an average true owner would use it.

Notorius – Cave case where (D) had cave that went under (P) property. (P) sued. Could not have adverse possession because it was not notorious.

property: jan 26 2010 class notes

recap:

finders.

what are the interests of a private party who owns the real property on which the chattel is found? (hanna v. peale showed factual grounds on which we could decide who has superior claim to the chattel based on relationship of found and real property; relationship between the property and land owners)

what is the distinction between lost and mislaid property? policy concerns -- under factual circumstances, our policies would be better served by giving better title to finder for property that is lost, and for mislaid property our policies would be better served by giving title to whomever land owner the property is laid on. why? true owner might be more likely to get the property back (though this of course is speculative).

bailments (contractual transfer of possession but not title, and mutual understanding that the property will be returned)

disputes of who has rights to property and possession.

peet v. roth hotel.

what duties arise when a bailment is created?

previous cases had distinguished who was receiving the benefit, but the modern trend is to consider many circumstances formulating the standard of care applicable.

the winkfield.

"The wrongdoer, having once paid full damages to the bailee, has an answer to any action by the bailor."

who are the parties in interest? the postmaster, who is bailee for the mail

what is the gov't as bailee going to do with respect to the claims? bringing the claim on behalf of the parties whose mail was lost

claim is asserted against the owners of the winkfield on the basis of making the

tort claim for damages to the postal materials, and the claim was admitted, because there was a regulation that limited its

what's the problem? there's only so much money in the pot for all the claims. so part of the process is distinguishing the claims that will be allowed and which will not.

three classes of claims - (1&2) postmaster has been sued for value of lost packages, and so postmaster has standing as bailee. (3) no known value of unID parcels because no claims.

get to master of the roles on appeal to third type of claim...

reasoning: spins around jus tertii as both defense and offense. postmaster has a superior claim to the value inherent in the third class of parcels to anyone else except the true owners and therefore can assert the rights against a wrong doer to protect them.

why???

1) bailment where true owner has entrusted the postmaster with posession, and we know at some point in time, the true owner is going to come after the bailee for the property or value.

2) if you can forsee a situation where a loss might occur, it's better to put the liability of loss on you because you then will be responsible for protecting from the loss of property.

a possessor can recover against a wrongdoer who damages or destroys the chattel.

3) the bailor and bailee already have a relationship, so it is more efficient and easy to rely on this relationship for recovery.

relativity of title review

at some point in time, it will be too late to assert claim of ownership...

adverse possession. "possession ripens into title."

van valkenburge v. lutz

the property

time is important in adverse possession cases.

lutz bought and conveyed in 1912, and begins his truck farm probably around this same time. he builds charlie's house around 1920.

in 1937, the van valkenburgs move into the area.

spring of 1946, lutz (34 years) and van valkenburgs (9 years), when van valkenburgs buy lot 19 at auction for tax forclosure, and had the cops usher lutz off the property and then erect a fence on lot 19, even blocking lutz' way to his home.

1948 - lutz sues and wins rights to use traveled way to access his property even though he doesn't own it

what is this really all about? relationships and hurt feelings are the core of the cases we're looking at so far... this case, like pierson v. post, is really about the soul of the community...

how is prescriptive right different from ownership? lutz had some rights, at least to use the land, but not right to ownership

on appeal - was the occupation sufficient to establish title by adverse possession? did his use merit the land becoming his?

what must the lutz show to establish adverse possession? (1) actual possession (2) exclusive to adverse possessor (3) adverse or hostile (4) open&notorious (5) continuous for the statutory period -- in this case, adverse and claim of right is at question.

the dissent says that actions should speak louder than words.

why have a doctrine of adverse possession in the first place?

Monday, January 25, 2010

baker v. carr