mistake and mens rea.
mistake of fact or law is a defense to a crime that requires specific intent; a mistaken person simply lacks specific intent.
in general intent crimes, mistake of law is not a defense but mistake of fact may be a defense if the mistake is reasonable and the accused's actions would have been lawful had the facts been as s/he believed.
we've looked at people v. navarro, and seen that larceny, as a specific intent crime, cannot be committed without the specific intent to steal. reasonable mistake of fact may be a defense where it negates a required mental element of a crime.
mistake of law arises in two contexts:
(1) because of ignorance as to collateral law, the defendant lacks the mental state required
(2) the defendnat had the req mental state but was unaware that his conduct was proscribed by crim law
mistake as to collateral law:
if the defendant was ignorant or mistaken to a particular legal matter (mistaken to collateral law), he may have lacked necessary mens rea.
mistake as to criminal statute:
criminal mens rea requires only the defendant intent to do the prohibited act. igonorance or mistake of the law is not a defense on the theory that suh defense would undermine law enforcement. the exceptions to this are
(1) statutes later held unconstitutional
(2) judicial decision -- reliance on a judicial decision (even if not highest court) may be defense
(3) official interpretation - reliance on an official interpretation may constitute defense
** good faith advice of counsel is NOT a defense
mpc § 2.02(9): neither knowledge nor recklessness or negligence as to whether conduct constitutes an offense …is an element of such offense, unless the definition of the offense or the Code so provides
mpc 2.04(1): Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if: (a) the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense; or (b) the law provides that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense.
statutory interpretation of general intent crime.
people v. marerro.
nypl 15.20
at trial, marerro requested a jury instruction that would have led to an acquittal if the jury found that he reasonably believed the exemption applied to him. trial court refused and appellate court confirmed. the court held that when specific intent is an element of the crime, a mistake of law may constitute a defense. however, in this case, liability for weapon's possession is imposed regardless of intent and so mistake of law is no defense. the proper rule of defense applies when teh defendant relies on an official statement of the law that is thereafter determined to be invalid or incorrect. it applies only when the statute in fact authorizes the conduct, not when a defendant incorrectly reads the law (or, since this was a valid law, it was only reasonable for a person to have read the statute correctly and since defendant didn't do this, he couldn't have been reasonable... the way the defenant wants the statute read would encourage mistakes, which could lead to a utiliatarian slippery slope). even if it means some unfairness to marerro, the maj policy argument is that for utilitarian reasons, this is the most just result.
the dissent says the mistake was a reasonable one for a person to have made in good faith. the dissent is that you can't deter mistakes, and so for public policy it neither effective retributively or utilitarianily to make an example of marerro. 15.02 doesn't necessarily make a reasonable mistake of law defense.
marerro is convicted under 265.02.
in staples, firearm meant assault rifle. does marerro possess a loaded firearm here?
"pistol or revolver" = firearm for the statute.
"gun + bullets in your pockets" = loaded firearm
what's marerro's defense? he is exempt because he's a peace officer, and he gets this defense from nypl 265.20 (1)(c)
marerro is not a cop or a court employee but he claims he is a peace officer, relying on the language
"Peace officers as defined by section 2.10 of the criminal procedure law."
court says, "no, this doesn't apply to you." and for good measure -- the key statutory language is so specific and so silent on a federal prison officer having his weapon off duty, that it must as a matter of interpretation not be valid.
marerro then asserts that he was mistaken as to the law: that 265.20 + 2.01 (peace officer definition) should equal a reasonable interpretation of the law. and why does he say this is reasonable? he asked a bunch of people (gun shop owner, prof at john jay univ, boss, etc)
n.b. -- specific provisions will trump general provisions because specific will be presumed to show legislative intent more clearly.
nypl 265.20 exemptions
(a) sections... 265.03... shall not apply to:
1. possession of any of the weapons... specified in sections... 265.03.. by the following:...
(c) peace officers as defined by section 2.10 of the criminal procedure law
nycpl 2.10 persons designated as peace officers
not withstanding the provisions of any general, special or local law or charter to the contrary, only the following persons shall have the powers of, and shall be peace officers:...
25. ... correction officers of any state correctional facility or of any penal correctional institution
NJ mistake of law defense: "mistake of law where you try really hard and its so conclusive that anybody would have made the same reasonable mistake"
so when can you claim a mistake of law defense? almost never. the exceptions listed above are official estoppel to keep judicial and legislative enforcement fair when it is relied on.
n.b. - legislative intent, public policy, text interpretation arguments... what the heck are the differences???
statutory interpretation - specific intent crime.
lambert v. california
this is an omission crime -- ms. lambert did not realize that there was this kind of statute and her culpability was that she did not know
the application of this case is very narrowly construed: it is only held to cases where the conduct is wholy passive and unforseeable
book problem (p.208)
pharmacists must compile info about all users of viagra. a pharmacist who does not know is arrested for omission of non-compliance.
this person would lose because it is not unforseeable to pharmacists as to what you would/not be required to do.
in fact, lambert would probably be decided differently today because
cheek v. united states
D believes income tax is unconstitutional and he wants jury instructions that he acted without the willfulness required for conviction. the trial court gave instructions that objective reasonable good-faith understanding is a defense to willfulness but disagreement with the law is not. the judge also instructed that an honest but unreaonable belief does not negate willfulness. US remanded: the volume of IRS statutes makes it difficult for average citizens to know their responsibilities, and pointed to the definition of "willfulness" from united states v. murdock (a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty).
willfulness:
(1) the law imposed a duty on the defendant
(2) the defendant knew of the duty
(3) the defendant voluntarily and intentionally violated the duty
*** the defendant's views about the validity of tax laws are irrelevant to the issues of willfulness and need not be heard by the jury. therefore the jury did not need to consider whether or not his beliefs to file the return were reasonable, only needed to hear and decide whether he truly believed the IRC did not purport to treat wages as income.
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