crim law: march 22 2010 class notes

• depraved
• intent to kill - heat of passion
• intent to inflict grevious bodily harm
• reckless
• negligent

depraved heart... abandoned heart...

is "depravity" a mental state? this question has plagued the NYS courts for years.


NYPL 125.25 (2):
- under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, (?? - 
          is this circumstance element of actus reus or is this mens rea?)
- he recklessly (mens rea)
- engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, (actus reus: conduct)
- and thereby causes the death of another person. (actus reus: result)

people v. register: D - while drunk - inexplicably shoots a friend
                             it's hard to prove recklessness when the act is very
                             removed from the result....
                             we can remove "while" drunk
                             see 15.05 = *can't say not reckless because you're drunk!*
                                                  but it is a defense to depraved indifference


people v. gomez: D drives at high rate of speed on a crowded sidewalk
                            jury picked murder

people v. france: D kills V while fleeing police in a stolen car at 4am
                            TOF found it to be reckless (manslaughter)

people v. sanchez: sudden point-blank shooting (claimed self-defense)
people v. suarez: D stabs girlfriend three times (claimed self-defense)

what's the defense? SD. which means that the defendant had intent. 
in both of these cases, the result was murder-2 (depraved indifference).
why? most likely compromise... 
"twin indictments": lawyers would plead both SD and depraved indifference
self-defense + depraved indifference = mutually exclusive!

currently, depraved indifference cannot be for one-on-one crimes, only for things where the defendant shows that his recklessness was aimed at a group or class but not at a specific person.

mental state.
one-on-one killings: (1) abandonment of a vulnerable victim to likely death under circumstances of "utter callousness to the victim's mortal plight"; or (2) brutal or prolonged course of conduct that "intensify or prolong a victim's suffering."

people v. feingold: D, attempting suicide, blew up the apt...

danger to the public: the court said that depraved indifference is a mental state. "utter disregard for the value of human life -- a willingness to act not because one intends harm, but because one simply doesn't care whether grievous harm results or not."

the one-on-one definition is recklessness, the danger to the public mental state is depraved heart murder even without intent to kill.

these come down to subjective judgment: is the person who fires in a crowded bar as bad as the guy who points a gun and says i want *you* to die....




unintentional killings: unjustified risk-taking.... 

state v. williams.
14 day period: if the burden is on the prosecution to show when the williams were negligent, the best gauge is the smell from gangrene. this happens about day 4-5. the doctor says that at day 7, the kid could not have been saved.
does the williams' inaction during days 7-14 have any impact on the death? NO (it's like oxendine)
the prosecutor has to find the omission in day 1-7 + mental state required.

negligence in this case: "not what a reasonable person would do in the current situation."

at what point is it criminal to make the wrong call about the child's symptoms?

the parents didn't take the child because they were afraid of being wrongfully accused of mistreatment of their child.

utilitarian argument.
what behavior can we deter? we don't need a utilitarian issue for deterring behavior that's not deterrable cause there's already enough incentives for parents to take care of their kids
this punishment can send a message to parents to err on the side of caution.

felony murder.

the unlimited rule: "one is guilty of murder if a death results from conduct during the commission or attempted commission of any felony."

in NYS, felony murder is murder - 2 (unintentional), along with depraved indifference

the mental state is the mental state of the felony.

the jury will decide.
1. dean simmons chases rich to steal his wallet. rich trips and dies. felony murder.
2. dean simmons is chasing rich down the street. rich trips and hits his head. he dies from the injury.
    we would ask "was dean simmons reckless? did he have depraved intent?
3. dean simmons picks rich's pocket. rich is looking for his pocket, falls on the track and gets hit by a
    train....

MPC doesn't really have felony murder because they think the rule is doctrinally consistent but not analytically valid.
utilitarian: we want to deter people from committing felonies.  is there a better/more direct way of stopping felonies? increase the penalty for felonies in the first place. what's the real motive? encourage careful felonies...

retributive: you want to blame somebody for the person who got killed. you don't have a lot of sympathy for a felon when you have a dead innocent, so the retributive desire is very powerful.

next class: limitations on felony murder...
(a) inherently dangerous felony
(b) independent felonious purpose

crim law: march 19 2010 class notes

common law: manslaughter has four elements
1. adequate provocation (matter of law)
2. done in the "heat of passion"
3. no time to cool off (fairly factual)
4. causal link

adequate provocation.
old common law                                                        
1. adultery                                          
2. mutual combat                                                  

3. serious assault

4. serious injury to a close relative              
5. unlawful arrest                                               

                                   modern common law
           D's passion must be reasonable given the provocation
                             OBJ                              SUB
              "reasonable to ordinary"   "reasonable for D"
                            words alone are not enough

                    
                   MPC manslaughter -
 EED (extreme emo disturbance, culpability)

  1. D acted under influence of EED (SUB)              

      2. for which there was a "reasonable 

      explanation or excuse," determined

  MPC has a more friendly "post-freudian"
         approach to D's decision making  
and words alone may satisfy provocation under MPC

NYS homicide laws
murder - 1                                 intent to kill, premeditated         grade A+
murder - 2                                 intent to kill, not premed            grade A
        ask at murder - 2 "is there a factor that would make this murder - 1, or is there a 
                                     mitigating factor that would make this man - 1 (such as EED)?"


unintentional killings.
if the D kills someone by accident:

the first thing to ask is "was the D acting with criminal negligence? was this a substantial risk, and should the D have known about that risk?" 

if so, criminally negligent homicide.

if not, then no crim neg, and ask "was the D reckless? was there a risk and did D know of the risk?" 

if yes, then manslaughter - 2.

then ask, "is this killing so bad, that it is as bad as murder? does it fall doctrinally under 'deprave indifference/ extreme/ abandoned heart?"

common law approach:
malice aforethought
1. intent to kill

second degree murder
1. intent to kill, not premeditated
2. intent to inflict g.b.h.
3. depraved heart

voluntary manslaughter = intent to kill/ heat of passion
involuntary manslaughter = reckless/negligent

people v. knoller

if you're the prosecutor, did knoller intend to kill whipple? no.

step 1: reckless
a. keeping two combat dogs in an apt building was a substantial and unjustifiable risk (memorize this!).
   best evidence: the vet's letter
   what if the D was to say, "i think that the vet is wrong?"
   supporting evidence: 30 incidents of the dogs threatening people

it's not easy to set the standard
(be sure to review the full case on LN) 

trial court says the difference is between the knowledge of
"high probablity of death"

and the court of appeal says that
"conscious disregard of the risk of serious bodily injury"

if consciousness is just about bodily injury, it will be very low, objectively.

supreme court says that it's a
"conscious disregard of the danger of human life."

so the court says not guilty of murder, unless the defendant was aware that she created the high probability of death (n.b., because the CA court considers the standards of 'base antisocial purpose' and 'high probability of harm' are the same).... and it makes sense, because there are people who are making the conscious choice to kill appearing before the court all the time. on the other hand, this is pretty bad. the death was awful. the victim was appealing and the defendants are weird and unsympathetic.

what if she were a dog whisperer? would knoller still fit the bill for a reckless regard for human life, for keeping dogs but with motives for doing good for the animals? the higher the degree of risk and the more despicable the reasons, the more it reflects badly on the defendant's motives.

NYPL 125.25 (2)
* under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life,
* recklessly (recklessly = substantial)
* engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person (grave = more than
   substantial)
* and thereby causes the death of another person

people v. heidgen
russian roulette of drunk driving.
getting drunk instigates possibility of recklessness which you know or should have known could ensue if you chose to drink.
but depravedness? can you prove that he intentionally drove the wrong way on the parkway?