crim law: feb 22 2010 class notes

mpc 2.02
purposely: conscious object
knowingly: aware
recklessly: consciously disregards substantial and unjustifiable risk
negligently: should be aware of substantial and unjustifiable risk

(reckless and negligent are gross deviation from standard of care)

state v. nations: see case brief from feb 8 2010.

the missouri statute: a person commits the crime of endangering the welfare of a child when he knowingly encourages, aids or causes a child less than 17yo to engage in any conduct (injurious to the child's welfare). 

in this offense, knowledge of the age is an element of the crime.

mpc 2.02 (7): if knowledge is a requirement that must be satisfied, then there must be a high probability that the person knew of the age, unless the actor actually believes that the condition doesn't exist (i.e., that nations didn't know the girl's age)

but missouri didn't adopt all of MPC 2.02. in fact, the legislature specifically rejected section 2.02(7). this probably reflects a conscious choice that should be read into the statute.

for this case, is this a good result? no. proof problem: under a retributive argument, nations seems culpable of willful blindness. from a utilitarian standpoint, nations seems injurious to child welfare and that she should be deterred.

what's a more effective way of getting to the conduct that you want to deter? what makes nations culpable here? if she was intentionally ignorant, that will suffice to establish knowledge.

willful blindness = "you want the job? don't tell me how old you are."
not willful blindness = "you say you're 17? well, OK, i guess you look 17."

flores-figueroa v. us In Flores-Figueroa v. United States, the Court will consider whether, to secure a conviction under this statute, the Government must show that the defendant knew that the means of identification he used belonged to another person.

18 USC 1028(a)(1): The federal aggravated identity theft statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), imposes a mandatory two-year sentence on anyone who, during and in relation to certain predicate offenses, “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person.”

knowingly: mens rea
transfers, possesses or uses: conduct
without lawful authority: attendant circumstances
a means of ID: attendant circumstances
of another person: attendant circumstances

prosecution will want to have to just prove conduct. prosecution will want as few elements to apply to the mens rea as possible.
defense will want the prosecution to have to prove everything.

example, if you mistakenly take someone else's student card believing its your student card, the government would argue that you knowingly took the ID, used it, without the lawful authority from the owner, as a means of ID. the prosecution does not want for "of another person" to be included.

why not? how would this have helped figueroa? 
because of the difference in using fake and real ID: therefor, did congress intend knowingly to apply to "of another person"

the US says that congress meant for "knowingly" to apply until "of another person", but not to include that phrase.
mpc 2.02(4) says: when the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.

what is the prosecution's best argument for legislative intent? burden of proof (proof problem): congress could not have intended 'of another person' because it is too difficult to prove in the ID theft market that the actor knew that the numbers were real or fake.

a good argument, but the US doesn't buy it. alito says that the statute construction is being overanalyzed: commas that are parenthetical commas change the meaning of a sentence by describing persons, places, and things.

mens rea and statutory interpretation
1. a mens rea term is presumed to modify all material elements of a statute, unless a contrary indication plainly appears.
yermian case: the actor made a false statement but says that he didn't know that he was making a false statement to the government, and therefore he's not guilty of the crime. does knowingly apply to the first element? this is a different harm, and the application gives not only jurisdiction but also to give power to the government.

2. mens rea at the beginning of a statute usually modifies all elements.
3. mens rea in the middle of a statute usually modifies only following elements.

when there's not a mental state to the mpc, you defer to the four culpability states. 

problem.
A holds B as false imprisonment.
false imprisonment: intentionally seize a person, without authorization of law, and confine him against his will.
intentionally: mens rea
seize: conduct
a person: attendant circumstances
without authorization of law: attendant circumstances
confine him: conduct
against his will: attendant circumstances
does the mental state 
"without authorization of law" is carved out of the statute to keep the mens rea from applying to that element.
without authorization of law is therefore a general intent element.
what do we do when something is general intent element? look to if the mistake was reasonable.

under common law, general/specific intent matters. under statutory law, general/specific do not matter.

burglary: intentionally breaking and entering the dwelling house of another at night, with the intent to commit a felony therein.
intentionally: mens rea
breaking and entering:
the dwelling house
of another
at night
with the intent to commit a felony therein

nypl 140.25: a person is guilty of burglary in the 2nd degree when he (the subject)
knowingly: mens rea
enters or remains: conduct
unlawfully: attendant circumstances
in a building: attendant circumstances
with the intent to commit a crime therein,: specific intent
and when... (2) The building is a dwelling (this is an independent clause and a legislative convention. knowingly does not apply to this phrase, and indicates it by raising a new subject and ): attendant circumstances

140.30 a person is guilty of burglary in the 1st degree...
in a dwelling (instead of in a building): attendant circumstances

ryans case (not in the book): actor was growing illegal mushrooms. the nypl formally said that a person was guilty of CPCS in 2nd degree when
knowingly and: mens rea
unlawfully: attendant circumstances
possesses: conduct
25 milligrams or more of: attendant circumstances
a hallucinogen: attendant circumstances

 actor argues that he could not have known that there were 25 milligrams in the hallucinogen. proof problem: it's too hard to prove that the actor knew the weight of the drug. so actor got off.

220.18. a person is guilty of CPCS in the 2nd degree when he
knowingly and: mens rea
unlawfully: attendant circumstances
possesses: conduct
a hallucinogen: attendant circumstances
and said hallucinogen weighs 25 milligrams or more: attendant circumstances (therefore, knowledge of the weight is not an element that the mens rea applies to)
us v. morris