fee simple. a fee simple is the greatest interest in land the law allows.
historically, the common law formula for estates in land:
"to A and his/her heirs" -- only signifies that it is a fee simple absolute
the modern alternative:
"to A"
we need to understand the vocabulary of transfers at death.
p. 183, problem 3:
O conveys greenacre to A and heirs. when there is a debt, the creditors can attach debtors property. does B have an interest in greenacre that her creditors can attach? - no, B does not have an interest in the property until A dies.
inheritance is a formula. a living person has no heirs. you can't be an heir unless you survive the death of the true owner. you can't know until someone dies who their heirs might be. heirs are takers under intestate succession laws. a "mere expectancy" is not a legal future interest.
p. 185, problem 2:
O dies intestate without issue. does A have an interest in the estate? must distinguish between issue and heirs. heirs are not limited to issue, and can include ancestors and collaterals.
p. 185, problem 3:
O conveys blackacre to A for life, remainder to B and heirs (at the time of this conveyance, who owns the property? A owns for life, and B owns the remainder in fee simple absolute). B dies intestate without heir (A's death terminates the life estate, and B has no heirs at death). A then dies. who owns the land? the property asheets (goes to the estate).
life estate.
common law formula: "to A for life/ as long as she shall live (and then to B)"
what happens when a life tenant dies? the chattel or land could go back to the grantor,
life estate is always followed by a future interest, but the interest doesn't always have to be the same (it just becomes possessory by operation of law). the owner could hold a remainder or a reversion. basically, this just means that no additional legal action is needed to create the possessory right to the property once the life tenant dies. just like magic, the remainder or reversion interest goes from future interest to real, possessory interest.
what happens if A (life tenant) sells interest to C before death?
life estate pur autre vie: C has the right to possession and all other rights of a life tenant until A dies.
A cannot sell what she does not own (i.e., the future interest that becomes possessory upon her death). she has no power to destroy the reversion or remainder.
complications.
numerus clausus: in any kind of case where the grantor's intent may be ambiguous, rules of construction are used to establish the intent. similarly to gruen, the intention will be given deference in light of all the writings/deeds/grants. if the grantor's will has a clause in conflict with recognized property rights (like restraint to alienation), then the grant will be read against that intention (we're not going to deny people their rights just because your will says so).
per policy, numerus clausus helps to promote easy, efficient transfer of property rights.
ambiguous grants, restriction to use and restraints or alienation.
white v. brown. 559 S.W. 2d 938
executrix/executor is one who executes a will.
mrs. white has prepared a holographic will (see statute of wills - this is not OK in every juris)
the problem: the white/lied women have lived in the same house for a number of years, and lied wants evelyn white to be able to continue living there until she dies, and makes sandra white-perry the executrix. however, mrs. lied was one of ten children, and she was survived by 2 sisters who could have taken property in intestate laws transferred their property rights under quick claim to mrs. white. however, there are still nieces and nephews who claim that mrs. white only had a life estate and they have an interest in the reversion.
so basically - if this will created a life estate for mrs. white but didn't give any instruction for after mrs. white's death, it would revert to mrs. lied's estate in reversion. her sisters gave up their rights as heirs at law, but the nieces and nephews did not.
mrs. white holds some interest in the house, and is now suing the heirs at law reversion for a reconstruction of the will's language.
the language of the original will either lays out a fee simple will or not.
the chancellory determines the issue was unambiguous and that the house should be sold. this is NOT what the whites want because the proceeds from the house would not be split with them if they only had a partial interest.
the whites appeal to the SC of tenn, saying that mrs. lied's intents were not unambiguous in the will. it's not unambiguous whether or not she intended to pass a life estate or an inheritance fee simple absolute.
what reasons to not divide up the land?
disagreements could arise between the holders of the land
standardization of property rights, promotion of economic efficiency by having one owner of the land (numerus clausus: protecting legally recognized property rights across the board. for example, if dee says "when I die, I give my house to my daughter to live there, and it can't be sold," the 'can't be sold' part is an idiosyncracy that can't be enforced because it is against the right to alienate).
how do we interpret this will?
lied was limiting the rights of white to use the land "i want evelyn white to have the house to live in."
should this distinction be relevant?
to simplify the things that we can bargain over in land
how do property economics ideas play into the decision in this case?
chrysler was looking to build a plant in the area, and it would be economically positive to read the will as FSA.
but how does that play into the issues of restriction of use and restraints on alienation?
- you can't do the restraint of alienation. you can't go against the common law to enforce someone's will.
- but between the life estate and fee simple...
public policy wants us to keep the property as economically pulled together as possible.
notes (p 196-97).
let's say we agree with the dissent, and the heirs want to sell the land. how do you divide the property?
see mortality tables to calculate mrs. white's reasonable life expectance, rate of interest etc to determine her share. remainder goes to relatives' estate.
conflicts between life tenants and remaindermen.
baker v. weedon
aka doc's kids v. "holly" lula mae (that should make this case easy to remember!)
the MS highway dep't wants a right of way to the land, and so the state checks the records and determines the grandkids have an interest that they weren't aware of.
the grandkids and elderly anna agree to settle the right of way for $20K with anna to receive $7500.
the property is currently worth $168K. the court accepts as fact that the land will be worth $336K in four years.
anna wants to force a judicial sale of the land. why can't she just sell it?
the interests of all the parties is different:
- anna has a life estate ("to anna for life and then to my heirs")
- anna has immediate needs for her health and welfare that are not being met. the property is worth a lot less as a farm right now than as a highway property. the income off the interest would be substantially higher than the income from the farm.
- the grandkids interest is to maximize the value of their inheritance. the remaindermen stand to gain much more if they can wait out the clock, a luxury the life tenant doesn't have.
the core dispute is over the life tenant's right to use the property in a way that will best meet her needs and the remaindermen's rights to future interest of speculative gains. the lower court gives anna what she wants, based on economic waste (the property is not being utilized to its fullest potential right now).
the appellate court says, no the test for judicial sale is whether sale is necessary and in the best interest for all parties with interests in the land. the immediate sale is not in the best interest of the remaindermen. (see the analysis with the actuarial tables)
SC MS tells the chancellory to use its equitable powers and divy up the baby solomon style: sell off a chunk of the land for the life tenant's needed funds or to hypothecate (take over the mortgage) for anna's care and maintenance.
the court basically wants the parties to be creative in equity to settle all of their needs fairly.
this case does not have to do with the doctrine of waste. this doctrine gives a legal cause of action to holders of future interest for specific performance or injunction if the life tenant is doing something to the property that interferes with their rights.
waste (where rights of land are divided up between parties, each party has an obligation to not use the property in a way that interferes with the other parties interests in the land)
for life tenants, this makes sense: a life tenant of a home could knock the house down (right to possession) but it damages the heir's interests (the expectation to get the house)
affirmative waste changes that the life tenant makes to the estate that negate its value or deplete its resources, but that are necessary for the tenant's use during right to possession
permissive waste omissions or negligence, failure to take reasonable care of the property
legal life estates can create a lot of problems:
- limit marketability of the land (because fractional ownership of land is not most
- interests of the parties may not align and thereby difficult to make effective and productive use of the land
trust.
- three parties: settlor (creates the trust), trustee (holds the legal title as fiduciary. trustee can make all the decisions), beneficiary (holds equitable title. beneficiaries can be divided over time.)
"to A and his/her heirs" -- only signifies that it is a fee simple absolute
the modern alternative:
"to A"
we need to understand the vocabulary of transfers at death.
inheritance of a fee simple problems.
p. 183, problem 3:
O conveys greenacre to A and heirs. when there is a debt, the creditors can attach debtors property. does B have an interest in greenacre that her creditors can attach? - no, B does not have an interest in the property until A dies.
p. 185, problem 2:
O dies intestate without issue. does A have an interest in the estate? must distinguish between issue and heirs. heirs are not limited to issue, and can include ancestors and collaterals.
p. 185, problem 3:
O conveys blackacre to A for life, remainder to B and heirs (at the time of this conveyance, who owns the property? A owns for life, and B owns the remainder in fee simple absolute). B dies intestate without heir (A's death terminates the life estate, and B has no heirs at death). A then dies. who owns the land? the property asheets (goes to the estate).
life estate.
common law formula: "to A for life/ as long as she shall live (and then to B)"
what happens when a life tenant dies? the chattel or land could go back to the grantor,
life estate is always followed by a future interest, but the interest doesn't always have to be the same (it just becomes possessory by operation of law). the owner could hold a remainder or a reversion. basically, this just means that no additional legal action is needed to create the possessory right to the property once the life tenant dies. just like magic, the remainder or reversion interest goes from future interest to real, possessory interest.
what happens if A (life tenant) sells interest to C before death?
life estate pur autre vie: C has the right to possession and all other rights of a life tenant until A dies.
A cannot sell what she does not own (i.e., the future interest that becomes possessory upon her death). she has no power to destroy the reversion or remainder.
complications.
numerus clausus: in any kind of case where the grantor's intent may be ambiguous, rules of construction are used to establish the intent. similarly to gruen, the intention will be given deference in light of all the writings/deeds/grants. if the grantor's will has a clause in conflict with recognized property rights (like restraint to alienation), then the grant will be read against that intention (we're not going to deny people their rights just because your will says so).
per policy, numerus clausus helps to promote easy, efficient transfer of property rights.
ambiguous grants, restriction to use and restraints or alienation.
white v. brown. 559 S.W. 2d 938
executrix/executor is one who executes a will.
mrs. white has prepared a holographic will (see statute of wills - this is not OK in every juris)
the problem: the white/lied women have lived in the same house for a number of years, and lied wants evelyn white to be able to continue living there until she dies, and makes sandra white-perry the executrix. however, mrs. lied was one of ten children, and she was survived by 2 sisters who could have taken property in intestate laws transferred their property rights under quick claim to mrs. white. however, there are still nieces and nephews who claim that mrs. white only had a life estate and they have an interest in the reversion.
so basically - if this will created a life estate for mrs. white but didn't give any instruction for after mrs. white's death, it would revert to mrs. lied's estate in reversion. her sisters gave up their rights as heirs at law, but the nieces and nephews did not.
mrs. white holds some interest in the house, and is now suing the heirs at law reversion for a reconstruction of the will's language.
the language of the original will either lays out a fee simple will or not.
the chancellory determines the issue was unambiguous and that the house should be sold. this is NOT what the whites want because the proceeds from the house would not be split with them if they only had a partial interest.
the whites appeal to the SC of tenn, saying that mrs. lied's intents were not unambiguous in the will. it's not unambiguous whether or not she intended to pass a life estate or an inheritance fee simple absolute.
what reasons to not divide up the land?
disagreements could arise between the holders of the land
standardization of property rights, promotion of economic efficiency by having one owner of the land (numerus clausus: protecting legally recognized property rights across the board. for example, if dee says "when I die, I give my house to my daughter to live there, and it can't be sold," the 'can't be sold' part is an idiosyncracy that can't be enforced because it is against the right to alienate).
how do we interpret this will?
lied was limiting the rights of white to use the land "i want evelyn white to have the house to live in."
should this distinction be relevant?
to simplify the things that we can bargain over in land
how do property economics ideas play into the decision in this case?
chrysler was looking to build a plant in the area, and it would be economically positive to read the will as FSA.
but how does that play into the issues of restriction of use and restraints on alienation?
- you can't do the restraint of alienation. you can't go against the common law to enforce someone's will.
- but between the life estate and fee simple...
public policy wants us to keep the property as economically pulled together as possible.
notes (p 196-97).
let's say we agree with the dissent, and the heirs want to sell the land. how do you divide the property?
see mortality tables to calculate mrs. white's reasonable life expectance, rate of interest etc to determine her share. remainder goes to relatives' estate.
conflicts between life tenants and remaindermen.
baker v. weedon
aka doc's kids v. "holly" lula mae (that should make this case easy to remember!)
"always tryin' to hold on to wild things, doc. an' that's yo' problem. you cain't love a wild thing."
the MS highway dep't wants a right of way to the land, and so the state checks the records and determines the grandkids have an interest that they weren't aware of.
the grandkids and elderly anna agree to settle the right of way for $20K with anna to receive $7500.
the property is currently worth $168K. the court accepts as fact that the land will be worth $336K in four years.
anna wants to force a judicial sale of the land. why can't she just sell it?
the interests of all the parties is different:
- anna has a life estate ("to anna for life and then to my heirs")
- anna has immediate needs for her health and welfare that are not being met. the property is worth a lot less as a farm right now than as a highway property. the income off the interest would be substantially higher than the income from the farm.
- the grandkids interest is to maximize the value of their inheritance. the remaindermen stand to gain much more if they can wait out the clock, a luxury the life tenant doesn't have.
the core dispute is over the life tenant's right to use the property in a way that will best meet her needs and the remaindermen's rights to future interest of speculative gains. the lower court gives anna what she wants, based on economic waste (the property is not being utilized to its fullest potential right now).
the appellate court says, no the test for judicial sale is whether sale is necessary and in the best interest for all parties with interests in the land. the immediate sale is not in the best interest of the remaindermen. (see the analysis with the actuarial tables)
SC MS tells the chancellory to use its equitable powers and divy up the baby solomon style: sell off a chunk of the land for the life tenant's needed funds or to hypothecate (take over the mortgage) for anna's care and maintenance.
the court basically wants the parties to be creative in equity to settle all of their needs fairly.
this case does not have to do with the doctrine of waste. this doctrine gives a legal cause of action to holders of future interest for specific performance or injunction if the life tenant is doing something to the property that interferes with their rights.
waste (where rights of land are divided up between parties, each party has an obligation to not use the property in a way that interferes with the other parties interests in the land)
for life tenants, this makes sense: a life tenant of a home could knock the house down (right to possession) but it damages the heir's interests (the expectation to get the house)
affirmative waste changes that the life tenant makes to the estate that negate its value or deplete its resources, but that are necessary for the tenant's use during right to possession
permissive waste omissions or negligence, failure to take reasonable care of the property
legal life estates can create a lot of problems:
- limit marketability of the land (because fractional ownership of land is not most
- interests of the parties may not align and thereby difficult to make effective and productive use of the land
why have a life estate?
- want to provide for your wife as well as your childrenhow else might we provide for generational interests?
- create a trust
"this isn't the type of trustee in a jail, dear... as a rule..."
trust.
- three parties: settlor (creates the trust), trustee (holds the legal title as fiduciary. trustee can make all the decisions), beneficiary (holds equitable title. beneficiaries can be divided over time.)
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