http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/11/15/investing-in-someone-elses-lawsuit/the-costly-freedom-to-sue
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/10/20/the-justices-and-decorum-outside-the-courtroom
THAT'S US.
8 years ago
Showing posts with label exam prep. Show all posts
Showing posts with label exam prep. Show all posts
Tuesday, November 16, 2010
Wednesday, November 10, 2010
biz org class 23
exam answer:
have to give the facts, spot the issues, give the rules, give the analysis, then give the conclusion.
have to hit every element.
O'Hagen: the WSJ can trade on the information, because it owns the information.
could wyman buy shares expecting it could manipulate the price of the shares? no - that would violate 10(b)(5). but in O'Hagen, the party uses the information for his own personal benefit. there must be a rule against this to avoid this misappropriation. why must there be a rule of this? because rule 10(b)(5) demands deception of some kind. otherwise, it's not a 10(b)(5) case.
martha stewart. initially charged of insider trading but not found guilty of it. instead found guilty of obstruction of justice. thought that it would be problem for MSOM to be suspected of insider trading. so she told family and friends to sell ImClone stock, and she herself sold all the stock a day before the FDA announced that it would not approve the drug.
proxies: who pays for the solicitation?
have to give the facts, spot the issues, give the rules, give the analysis, then give the conclusion.
have to hit every element.
O'Hagen: the WSJ can trade on the information, because it owns the information.
could wyman buy shares expecting it could manipulate the price of the shares? no - that would violate 10(b)(5). but in O'Hagen, the party uses the information for his own personal benefit. there must be a rule against this to avoid this misappropriation. why must there be a rule of this? because rule 10(b)(5) demands deception of some kind. otherwise, it's not a 10(b)(5) case.
martha stewart. initially charged of insider trading but not found guilty of it. instead found guilty of obstruction of justice. thought that it would be problem for MSOM to be suspected of insider trading. so she told family and friends to sell ImClone stock, and she herself sold all the stock a day before the FDA announced that it would not approve the drug.
proxies: who pays for the solicitation?
Monday, August 30, 2010
proRo: problem
You are a solo practitioner in New York. You mainly represent individual clients in personal injury, domestic relations, and estate matters. Some of your friend have found that a great way to get new clients is to visit Internet chat rooms and have casual conversations with people who need legal advice. You have started visiting chat rooms also, partly in the hopes of getting new clients and partly because you like helping people in need (public good, and all that).
Two or three evenings a week, you sign in to one of several Internet chat rooms. Your screen name is "GoPats11" (you are a New England Patriots fan and think that Rex Ryan may well be the devil). Sometimes you visit the Accident and Injuries Chat Room, where accident victims share their stories and grievances. This chat room gives participants the option to share their e-mail addresses with other participants. You have always disclosed your e-mail address.
Two months ago, the chat room added a "legal hour" on Thursday evenings to enable accident victims to chat with lawyers. To reach the screen for the legal hour, a user must first click through a screen on which the sponsor of the chat room has posted the following notice:
"This chat room is for informational purposes only. Participating in this chat room does not establish an attorney-client relationship. This is a free service. You do not need to pay any subscription or make payments of any kind to participate in this chat room. If you agree to these terms, click the 'I agree' button. You will not be able to proceed to the legal hour screen unless you click the 'I agree' button."
About a month ago, you started logging on to the legal hour as a lawyer. Each Thursday night, you and the two other lawyers in the chat room were deluged with legal questions. Most of the questions were very general in nature, and you and the two other lawyers answered them in general terms. However, a few weeks ago one question (from "EyesOnFire," who did not disclose his or her e-mail address) was quite specific:
EyesOnFire: "I live in Queens. Five years ago, I bought a can of Slickster hair spray. When I pressed the button on top, the pressurized can exploded. The spray and some of the metal spewed all over the place, some at my face. Something got in both of my eyes. I went to the doctor and he rinsed my eyes and gave me some treatments. I didn't need to go into the hospital, and the treatments ended within six months. My health insurance covered my medical expenses. A year later, I thought the whole thing was over, but in the last year, my sight has been failing. The doctors think that although they got out all the metal, something in the chemicals must have caused slow, long-term deterioration in both eyes. They think I will go blind. Can I sue someone?"
You did not want to give EyesOnFire any false hope, so you wrote back:
GoPats11: "EyesOnFire, I am sorry to say that you won't be able to sue anyone. In New York, the statute of limitations for tort cases is only three years. Since this accident took place five years ago and you knew then that you had been injured, you would have had to bring any lawsuit several years ago. Unfortunately, the law imposes these sometimes artificial barriers to a fair recovery. I wish that I could be more encouraging."
The week after you had this conversation, you stumbled across an article that explained that California has an unusually long statute of limitations for products liability cases. Therefore, if EyesOnFire's hairspray was manufactured in California, and if the SOL applied to a suit against the manufacturer regardless of where the injury occurred, EyesOnFire might still have a viable claim. EyesOnFire has not logged into the chat room since that night, so you haven't been able to correct or clarify the information you provided.
Questions:
1. Are you in potential trouble?
2. Should you be at risk of liability for your comments in the chat room? If so, is this one of those 'no good deed goes unpunished' situations?
Two or three evenings a week, you sign in to one of several Internet chat rooms. Your screen name is "GoPats11" (you are a New England Patriots fan and think that Rex Ryan may well be the devil). Sometimes you visit the Accident and Injuries Chat Room, where accident victims share their stories and grievances. This chat room gives participants the option to share their e-mail addresses with other participants. You have always disclosed your e-mail address.
Two months ago, the chat room added a "legal hour" on Thursday evenings to enable accident victims to chat with lawyers. To reach the screen for the legal hour, a user must first click through a screen on which the sponsor of the chat room has posted the following notice:
"This chat room is for informational purposes only. Participating in this chat room does not establish an attorney-client relationship. This is a free service. You do not need to pay any subscription or make payments of any kind to participate in this chat room. If you agree to these terms, click the 'I agree' button. You will not be able to proceed to the legal hour screen unless you click the 'I agree' button."
About a month ago, you started logging on to the legal hour as a lawyer. Each Thursday night, you and the two other lawyers in the chat room were deluged with legal questions. Most of the questions were very general in nature, and you and the two other lawyers answered them in general terms. However, a few weeks ago one question (from "EyesOnFire," who did not disclose his or her e-mail address) was quite specific:
EyesOnFire: "I live in Queens. Five years ago, I bought a can of Slickster hair spray. When I pressed the button on top, the pressurized can exploded. The spray and some of the metal spewed all over the place, some at my face. Something got in both of my eyes. I went to the doctor and he rinsed my eyes and gave me some treatments. I didn't need to go into the hospital, and the treatments ended within six months. My health insurance covered my medical expenses. A year later, I thought the whole thing was over, but in the last year, my sight has been failing. The doctors think that although they got out all the metal, something in the chemicals must have caused slow, long-term deterioration in both eyes. They think I will go blind. Can I sue someone?"
You did not want to give EyesOnFire any false hope, so you wrote back:
GoPats11: "EyesOnFire, I am sorry to say that you won't be able to sue anyone. In New York, the statute of limitations for tort cases is only three years. Since this accident took place five years ago and you knew then that you had been injured, you would have had to bring any lawsuit several years ago. Unfortunately, the law imposes these sometimes artificial barriers to a fair recovery. I wish that I could be more encouraging."
The week after you had this conversation, you stumbled across an article that explained that California has an unusually long statute of limitations for products liability cases. Therefore, if EyesOnFire's hairspray was manufactured in California, and if the SOL applied to a suit against the manufacturer regardless of where the injury occurred, EyesOnFire might still have a viable claim. EyesOnFire has not logged into the chat room since that night, so you haven't been able to correct or clarify the information you provided.
Questions:
1. Are you in potential trouble?
2. Should you be at risk of liability for your comments in the chat room? If so, is this one of those 'no good deed goes unpunished' situations?
Monday, April 26, 2010
crim law: exam review
office hours -
Mon 3:15 - 5:15
4/30 9 - 12
5/3 2 - 4:30
5/7 11 - 12:30
adequate provocation v. EED-- essay question type analysis material.
point of extreme emo disturbance is to put the provocation on the defendant's thought processes. eed is easier than heat of passion.
state v. gerard -- gerard loses in MD. but as in cassasa, in NYS, gerard would have gotten to the jury and could have made an EED claim.
specific intent describes a category of crimes, and there's many different SI.
malice -- sometimes see in CL definitions. malice aforethought is a term of art. malice is a historical evolution, and usually constructive meaning is "intentionally/recklessly". you see "willfully" in statutes and often it means "intentionally/knowingly" but for example in tax statutes (cheeks v. us) we know that willfully means something different still.... there's many categories. which is part of why MPC is so helpful.
MPC 2-2o6 conditional intent: an example would be carjacking -- "gimme your car or i'll bash your head in," you can't defend 'i woudln't bash his head in if he gave me the car'.
sample Q: A pushes B, B stumbles and bumps into C, C falls in the pool and drowns.
B says "i didn't do anything"
creation of peril of the problem,
A is responsible (don't put fault on). A has a duty to save C. but if A doesn't know that B bumped into C, then wherewithal: A has a good argument that he failed to act b/c didn't know that he created the peril. no voluntary acts. such attenuated circumstances, that you can't link C to A. or negligence: if A turns around and says "cool, C fell" -- omission of act could be reckless or negligent, depending on the *mental state* BUT remember that mental state is separate from the omission!!
rape is an actus reus crime. in NYS, the mental state is intent to engage in forcible compulsion. so that intent would be a defense even if completely unreasonable. but if a case like regina v. morgan ever got to court, would mistake fly? simons says "not plausible: as a political matter, just wouldn't happen" what if there's a plausible argument that she wanted force? there's nothign in the statute to suggest that reasonableness is a standard for reasonable compulsion. however, there is an affirmative defense to rape that "D was not aware of the factors that rendered the D incapable of consent (besides age)"
NYS - need force. how much force is not clear. no means no: if the legis went out of its way to say that a reasonable person should have understood the rape -- the mere force required for regular sex, plus a "no" is likely going to be rape in the *third*
don't need MPC rape definitions, but do know stat rape under MPC.
NYPL 130 is the rape definitions.
defendant's usually don't proceed on a mistake platform: "i didn't mean to force, etc" so if the question of mistake never goes before the jury, it doesn't go to appellate.
3.04 + 3.09 interpretation: if you make a mistake and you're negligent, you're still "up"
what happens when you have an omission that creates the duty? not likely -- even if you have a legal duty to act
kennedy v. LA -- not a bright line
coker v. GA -- leaves open the window for death penalty for rape of children, but kennedy struck down as unC. however, immediately after, the court issued a revised opinion limiting kennedy to its own facts because they courts didn't want to change the application of death penalty in the military system.
if you thought you were doing something illegal, you can't claim mistake: the problem with this is that...
example: burglary, breaking and entry, and trespass. the actor's AR is burglary. but the mens rea is mistaken: he thinks
was he mistaken?
was the mistake reasonable?
imagine a state where mistake is a defense to stat rape: actor thought that she was of age. OK. BUT -- did you never the less think you were doing something illegal (let's say "fornication" is illegal). legal wrong doctrine says that even if you think you're doing something wrong for a different crime, you can't say that you're not guilty, and we'll convict you of the crime you actually did. the wrong is that it doesn't assign culpability to actors based on their choices. for example, actor possessses a package that he believes contains diamonds, but it's actually heroin -- he won't be convicted of the drug crime under MPC unless he knew it was drugs. but under CL legal wrong, he would be convicted of heroin smuggling/possession.
Mon 3:15 - 5:15
4/30 9 - 12
5/3 2 - 4:30
5/7 11 - 12:30
adequate provocation v. EED-- essay question type analysis material.
point of extreme emo disturbance is to put the provocation on the defendant's thought processes. eed is easier than heat of passion.
state v. gerard -- gerard loses in MD. but as in cassasa, in NYS, gerard would have gotten to the jury and could have made an EED claim.
specific intent describes a category of crimes, and there's many different SI.
malice -- sometimes see in CL definitions. malice aforethought is a term of art. malice is a historical evolution, and usually constructive meaning is "intentionally/recklessly". you see "willfully" in statutes and often it means "intentionally/knowingly" but for example in tax statutes (cheeks v. us) we know that willfully means something different still.... there's many categories. which is part of why MPC is so helpful.
MPC 2-2o6 conditional intent: an example would be carjacking -- "gimme your car or i'll bash your head in," you can't defend 'i woudln't bash his head in if he gave me the car'.
sample Q: A pushes B, B stumbles and bumps into C, C falls in the pool and drowns.
B says "i didn't do anything"
creation of peril of the problem,
A is responsible (don't put fault on). A has a duty to save C. but if A doesn't know that B bumped into C, then wherewithal: A has a good argument that he failed to act b/c didn't know that he created the peril. no voluntary acts. such attenuated circumstances, that you can't link C to A. or negligence: if A turns around and says "cool, C fell" -- omission of act could be reckless or negligent, depending on the *mental state* BUT remember that mental state is separate from the omission!!
rape is an actus reus crime. in NYS, the mental state is intent to engage in forcible compulsion. so that intent would be a defense even if completely unreasonable. but if a case like regina v. morgan ever got to court, would mistake fly? simons says "not plausible: as a political matter, just wouldn't happen" what if there's a plausible argument that she wanted force? there's nothign in the statute to suggest that reasonableness is a standard for reasonable compulsion. however, there is an affirmative defense to rape that "D was not aware of the factors that rendered the D incapable of consent (besides age)"
NYS - need force. how much force is not clear. no means no: if the legis went out of its way to say that a reasonable person should have understood the rape -- the mere force required for regular sex, plus a "no" is likely going to be rape in the *third*
don't need MPC rape definitions, but do know stat rape under MPC.
NYPL 130 is the rape definitions.
defendant's usually don't proceed on a mistake platform: "i didn't mean to force, etc" so if the question of mistake never goes before the jury, it doesn't go to appellate.
3.04 + 3.09 interpretation: if you make a mistake and you're negligent, you're still "up"
what happens when you have an omission that creates the duty? not likely -- even if you have a legal duty to act
kennedy v. LA -- not a bright line
coker v. GA -- leaves open the window for death penalty for rape of children, but kennedy struck down as unC. however, immediately after, the court issued a revised opinion limiting kennedy to its own facts because they courts didn't want to change the application of death penalty in the military system.
if you thought you were doing something illegal, you can't claim mistake: the problem with this is that...
example: burglary, breaking and entry, and trespass. the actor's AR is burglary. but the mens rea is mistaken: he thinks
was he mistaken?
was the mistake reasonable?
imagine a state where mistake is a defense to stat rape: actor thought that she was of age. OK. BUT -- did you never the less think you were doing something illegal (let's say "fornication" is illegal). legal wrong doctrine says that even if you think you're doing something wrong for a different crime, you can't say that you're not guilty, and we'll convict you of the crime you actually did. the wrong is that it doesn't assign culpability to actors based on their choices. for example, actor possessses a package that he believes contains diamonds, but it's actually heroin -- he won't be convicted of the drug crime under MPC unless he knew it was drugs. but under CL legal wrong, he would be convicted of heroin smuggling/possession.
Friday, April 9, 2010
how to take the property exam
1. everything assigned in class
2. rules (maj/minority, modern/classic,
3. any additional rules that may be applied
4. can talk about why we have certain rules and what the policy reasons for them are
2. rules (maj/minority, modern/classic,
3. any additional rules that may be applied
4. can talk about why we have certain rules and what the policy reasons for them are
Monday, March 22, 2010
crim law: new schedule and exam info.
housekeeping
new schedule:
(homicide assignments #13/14)
M 3/22
W 3/24
(rape assignments #16/17/18)
F 3/26
M 3/28
no more friday classes.
(self-defense)
M 4/5
W 4/7
M 4/12
(insanity)
W 4/14
(attempt)
M 4/19
W 4/21
end of classes.
EXAM
exam is closed book but will have all MPC and NYPL. study with those in hand.
new schedule:
(homicide assignments #13/14)
M 3/22
W 3/24
(rape assignments #16/17/18)
F 3/26
M 3/28
no more friday classes.
(self-defense)
M 4/5
W 4/7
M 4/12
(insanity)
W 4/14
(attempt)
M 4/19
W 4/21
end of classes.
EXAM
exam is closed book but will have all MPC and NYPL. study with those in hand.
Monday, March 8, 2010
Tuesday, February 9, 2010
culpability defined: crim law exam prep
*** class notes from today went hellah fast. need to flesh out***
mpc
PURPOSEFULLY
purposefulness is a subjective mental state.
KNOWINGLY
knowledge is a subjective mental state.
RECKLESSLY a person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defined an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. the risk must be of such a nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation form the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.
risk must be bad and unjustifiable.
recklessness is both subjective and objective determination mental state.
NEGLIGENTLY
nypl
INTENTIONALLY
KNOWINGLY
RECKLESSLY a
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
mpc
PURPOSEFULLY
purposefulness is a subjective mental state.
KNOWINGLY
knowledge is a subjective mental state.
RECKLESSLY a person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defined an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. the risk must be of such a nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation form the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.
risk must be bad and unjustifiable.
recklessness is both subjective and objective determination mental state.
NEGLIGENTLY
nypl
INTENTIONALLY
KNOWINGLY
RECKLESSLY a
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
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